We study optimal fee setting decisions by a monopoly online platform connecting advertisers with potential buyers in two environments: (1) a simple model that captures stylized features of advertising on search engines, social networks, and ad-supported email, and (2) a richer model that is more relevant for "directed" search at price comparison sites. While the platform can choose to charge both for impressions as well as clicks, we show that the platform maximizes pro…ts by using clickthrough fees exclusively. Our model o¤ers a rationale for the evolving practice of relying purely on clickthrough fees for revenues in many online advertising markets.
Introduction
The pricing of online advertising has undergone a sea change since its early days. The dominant old media model of paying per impression, the so-called CPM (cost per impression) model, has given way to a pricing model where most payments are made contingent on the viewer taking some action, typically clicking on the ad. 1 This is the so-called CPC (cost per click) model of pricing. In this paper, we investigate why platforms such as price comparison sites have shifted from CPM to CPC.
This change is usually seen as a response to pressure from advertisers worried about the performance of the new online media. Under the CPC model, an advertiser only pays when an ad is e¤ective-based on the user action of clicking. Thus, the risk of performance is shifted from the advertiser to the site displaying the ads. While there is little doubt that advertisers were (and still are) skeptical about the returns to online advertising, this paper points out an additional motivation for the shift: The platform hosting advertising contentwhat we have previously dubbed (Baye and Morgan, 2001 ) the "information gatekeeper"-also stands to bene…t from this pricing arrangement. Indeed, our main result is that, when CPC and CPM are both available and can be used jointly as pricing instruments, the platform maximizes its pro…ts by using CPC exclusively.
One might speculate that the CPC and CPM instruments are analogous to two-part tari¤s for a standard monopoly: Price at marginal cost and use a …xed fee to extract surplus from advertisers. Under this logic, one might erroneously conclude that the gatekeeper should optimally set the clickthrough fee at zero (its marginal cost) and use an impression fee to extract surplus from potential advertisers. 2 Where this logic goes wrong is that it ignores competition among advertisers. In the standard setting, one buyer's decision to accept the monopolist's o¤er does not impact the valuations of other buyers. In the present setting, one …rm's decision to have its ad displayed does impact the amount other …rms are willing to pay, since it reduces the likelihood that any given ad will be viewed as "best" and hence clicked by consumers. An optimizing platform takes this "competition for clicks" 1 One may wonder why "cost per impression" is abbreviated as CPM rather than CPI. The "M" in CPM is a legacy of the old media world where ads were priced per thousand impressions, with M being the Roman numeral for 1,000. 2 If the total number of impressions is known (or reasonably estimated) in advance, CPM is equivalent to the usual …xed fee.
into account in its pricing, and this makes the analysis of the optimal fee structure more complex than in the standard textbook case.
The tradeo¤s between CPC and CPM can be clearly seen in the simple model of optimal platform pricing presented in Section 2, where ads exogenously di¤er in their attractiveness and relevance to consumers. Since consumers click on the most attractive and relevant ad, a less attractive advertiser might still hope to obtain clicks via relevance. Advertisers enter until the least attractive (marginal) advertiser is just indi¤erent between utilizing this channel or earning zero from its outside option.
Suppose that impression and clickthrough fees are adjusted to maintain the same number of advertisers. Then a $1 increase in clickthrough fees requires a reduction in impressions fees in proportion to the chance that no other …rm's ad is displayed, i.e. an order statistic.
The platform bene…ts from such an adjustment in proportion to the chance that at least one …rm's ad is displayed (i.e., deemed relevant by its algorithm) since otherwise the platform gets no clickthrough fees. It is harmed by the reduction in impression fees to all …rms. The heart of the argument is establishing that this decrease is proportional to the chance that at least one …rm's ad is displayed. Since the former probability always exceeds the latter, a greater reliance on clickthrough fees raises platform pro…ts and hence the exclusive use of clickthrough fees is optimal (Proposition 1). Put di¤erently, while clickthrough fees operate on an order statistic-only the most attractive relevant …rm pays-impression fees a¤ect all …rms and hence are a blunter instrument for extracting surplus.
While the simple model is a clean illustration of this intuition, one may worry that the result may be altered or reversed when the attractiveness of ads or the value of the outside option is endogenized. To investigate this possibility, Section 3 considers a richer model in the spirit of Baye and Morgan (2001) , the …rst paper to examine the fee-setting behavior of a "gatekeeper" serving consumers and …rms in a two-sided online market. This model closely corresponds to a setting where the platform is a price comparison site. 3 The price charged by a …rm determines the attractiveness of its ad, while the …rm's outside option (i.e. the payo¤ when not using the site) depends on the intensity of advertising at the site.
Thus, both the attractiveness of ads and the value of eschewing the platform's channel are 3 Our model of price comparison sites derives from a much older literature of seller competition across channels (see, e.g. Varian (1980) , Rosenthal (1980) , Narasimhan (1988) ). With the exception of Baye and Morgan (2001) , this literature treats the cost of using various sales channels, including the platform, as exogenous.
endogenous.
Despite these modeling di¤erences, CPC remains the superior instrument for capturing surplus in the market (Proposition 3). Once again, the key driver is the fact that shoppers click on the best of the listed advertisements. Consequently, a …rm realizes that it is obliged to pay a clickthrough fee only if, ex post, its advertisement best matches the preferences of shoppers visiting the gatekeeper's site. In contrast, an advertiser pays the impression fee regardless of whether it generates any clicks, and before any information is revealed about whether its advertisement is "best." Finally, the gatekeeper's expected pro…ts from the impression fee depend on the average number of ads induced by the fee, while its pro…ts from clickthrough fees depend only on the probability that at least one …rm advertises (an order statistic). The contingent nature of clickthrough fees, coupled with this order statistic e¤ect, makes them a superior instrument for extracting surplus from potential advertisers.
These results obtain in a model where …rms are ex ante symmetric and there is no moral hazard. Obviously, if …rms were vulnerable to moral hazard on the part of the gatekeeper, the superiority of clickthrough fees over impression fees would be even greater.
The institutional structure of the richer model also allows us to study other features of online markets. Conversion rates, the chance that clicks are converted into sales, play a key role. We show that, while the exclusive use of clickthrough fees is optimal for any positive conversion rate, higher conversion rates lead to higher clickthrough fees and higher pro…ts for the gatekeeper. Firms also bene…t from higher conversion rates. An important insight to emerge from this analysis is that the platform only partly captures the gains from its investment in improving conversions. Thus, platforms will tend to underinvest in improvements. This perhaps helps to explain why conversions remain stubbornly low (about 5% at most) on these sites.
While both models share the same implication about the optimality of CPC pricing, Section 4 shows there are important di¤erences. Both models assume that there are (potentially small) transactions costs to …rms wishing to advertise on the platform. In the simple model, platform pro…ts increase continuously as transactions costs fall to zero. In the richer model, the outside option is endogenous and this leads to a discontinuity in payo¤s-platform pro…ts exhibit an upward jump when transactions costs are eliminated.
In a similar vein, exclusive contracts (i.e. contracts that o¤er a single advertiser the exclusive right to advertise on the platform) are of no bene…t to the platform in the simple model but are helpful in the richer model.
Our paper is related to the literature on optimal fee structures in two-sided markets when there is a monopoly platform. 4 An important di¤erence is that payo¤s in these models are increasing in the number of agents on the opposite side of the platform and independent of the number of agents on the same side of the platform. In other words, competition among users of the platform is e¤ectively absent. In the settings we study, it is natural to include competition and indeed it plays a key role in optimal platform pricing. Morgan (forthcoming)) paints a similar picture: Unless platforms are strongly horizontally di¤erentiated, the most likely market structure to emerge is a monopoly platform.
A Simple Model
The intuition behind our central results can be illustrated in a simple model that captures stylized features of advertising on platforms such as search engines, social networks, or advertising-supported e-mail. Suppose there is a unit mass of consumers that exclusively use a given platform to make search queries, to connect with friends, or for some other activity not directly related to the viewing of ads. This activity provides the platform with some information about consumer preferences. Given what it learns from consumer activity on its site, the platform attempts to match consumers with "relevant" ads from a pool of n 2 f1; 2; :::N g …rms that have opted to advertise through its channel. A given …rm's ad is identi…ed as relevant (and hence "pushed" to consumers) with probability 2 (0; 1). This allows for the possibility that the platform may not be able to perfectly match ads to consumers (some relevant ads may not be displayed) owing to imperfections in its proprietary algorithm. Figure 1 provides a screenshot that is representative of the types of ads considered in this section. Owing to heterogeneities in the creative abilities and long-run business decisions of …rms, the content and appeal of even relevant ads di¤ers across …rms; some …rms might advertise "free overnight shipping"or "20 percent discounts"while others emphasize product breadth or inventory depth. Let a summarize the overall quality of a given …rm's (multi-dimensional) ad, and note that the identity of the …rm displaying a given ad (e.g., Amazon) may also impact the overall quality. Order the …rms such that their ad qualities are a 1 > a 2 > > a N , which are common knowledge. A consumer who uses the platform is shown relevant ads, observes the quality of each, and clicks on the most attractive one (i.e., the ad with the highest value of a). The incremental value of a click, v, is assumed to be identical for each …rm. 5 Let " < v be a …rm's cost of delivering its ad copy to the platform, i.e., " represents a transactions cost. This guarantees that the platform can pro…tably induce at least one …rm to utilize its channel.
The platform announces an impression fee (T ) and a clickthrough fee (c), and then …rms make a decision to enter this advertising channel. Notice that, conditional on an ad being relevant (and hence being displayed), consumers click on the ad with the greatest overall quality (the highest value of a ). Thus, …rms with higher quality ads are more appealing to consumers and are expected to generate more clicks. Consequently, a …rm's incremental pro…t from entering the channel is increasing in a; entry continues until the …rm with the marginal a; denoted a n , earns zero incremental pro…ts by advertising in the channel: 6 (v c) (1 )
5 This does not rule out the possibility that …rms with larger ai's have made more substantial long-term investments and thus may have higher overall costs. These sunk investments do not a¤ect the incremental value of a click on this channel. The main conclusions in this section extend to the case of heterogeneous v's, provided that …rms with higher-quality ads have higher vi's. 6 As will become clear in the sequel, the platform has an incentive to set fees such that the marginal …rm earns exactly zero pro…ts; the integer constraint does not bind.
Intuitively, the marginal …rm only earns v c when its ad is relevant (a probability event)
and no other …rms' ads are relevant (which happens with probability (1 ) n 1 ). The …rm pays " to create its ad copy, and pays T when its ad is displayed (which occurs with probability ).
While the platform incurs costs in setting up and supporting its website as well as serving images to consumers, these costs typically do not vary with the number of advertisers on the site nor the fee structure to advertisers. As a consequence, we abstract away from this aspect of the platform's pro…t function. Thus, when n …rms choose to use the channel, the platform's pro…ts are
Here, the …rst term re ‡ects the platform's expected impression (or CPM) revenues while the second term is clickthrough (or CPC) revenues. Notice that revenues from impressions depend on the expected number of relevant ads (n ) while clickthrough revenues depend on the probability that at least one ad is relevant, (1 (1 ) n ).
The Optimality of Clickthrough Fees
Our strategy is to …rst identify the optimal fee structure for a given number of advertisers using the platform, and then to determine the platform's optimal n. Proposition 1 identi…es the optimal c and T for any given n, and shows that a platform maximizes pro…ts by using clickthrough fees exclusively. Proposition 2 then identi…es the number of advertisers the platform induces (by altering its fees) to maximize its pro…ts.
The following lemma is central to the results in this and subsequent sections of our paper Lemma 1 Suppose n > 1. Then the function (x; n) 1 x n nx n 1 (1 x) is strictly positive and strictly decreasing in x for all x 2 [0; 1).
Proof. First, notice that (0; n) = 1 and (1; n) = 0: Next, notice that
This lemma is intuitive if one views 1 x as the probability that a …rm's ad is relevant.
In this case, is simply the di¤erence between the probability that at least one …rm's ad is relevant and the probability that exactly one …rm's ad is relevant. Obviously, the former is larger than the latter.
Proposition 1 Suppose n …rms advertise through the platform. Then:
(a) If n = 1; any combination of clickthrough and impression fees satisfying equation
(1) maximizes the platform's pro…ts. Hence, the exclusive use of clickthrough fees is weakly optimal.
(b) If n 2; the platform maximizes pro…ts by exclusively using clickthrough fees.
(c) The pro…t maximizing clickthrough fee is
Proof. First, notice that, when n …rms enter, equation (1) must hold with equality. If the nth …rm earned strictly positive pro…ts (owing to the integer constraint), the platform could increase either c or T without a¤ecting n and increase its pro…ts.
When n = 1; the platform's pro…ts are U = T + c and, substituting for T using equation (1) ; we have
which is independent of c: In this case the platform is indi¤erent between using CPC or CPM and there is a continuum of (c; T ) 's that satisfy equation (1) . Thus, the platform can do no better than to set T = 0 and charge a clickthrough fee of c = v "= .
When n 2, the platform chooses c and T to maximize equation (2) subject to equation
(1). Solving for T using equation (1) and substituting into equation (2) yields
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. Thus, when n 2; the platform earns strictly more by exclusively using clickthrough fees. Solving equation (1) in terms of c yields the expression for c (n) in the proposition.
Proposition 1 indicates that clickthrough fees are weakly optimal, and in fact are strictly optimal when two or more …rms utilize the platform's channel. The proof reveals that the platform's marginal pro…t from impression fees is linear in the probability that a …rm's ad is deemed to be relevant. The marginal pro…t from clickthrough fees depends on an order statistic-the chance that at least one …rm's ad is relevant. When n = 1; these two probabilities coincide, and hence, we obtain a neutrality result reminiscent of Proposition 3 in Armstrong (2006) . In contrast, when n 2; consumers click the most attractive of the competing …rms'ads, which leads to a di¤erence between the two probabilities. Expressed di¤erently, given the linearity of the platform's pro…t function in c and T , the marginal pro…t from T is n while the marginal pro…t from c is (1 (1 ) n ) : Comparing the T -versus-c slopes in equations (2) and (1), Lemma 1 implies that the exclusive use of clickthrough fees is optimal when n 2. Notice that this order-statistic e¤ect stemming from competition among advertisers is absent in Armstrong (2006) and other papers on two-sided markets.
These papers assume that payo¤s only depend on the number of users on the other side of the market-independent of the degree of competition on the own side of the market.
One might wonder who wins and who loses from a shift from CPM to CPC (for a given n 2). Consumers observe the same set of ads regardless of whether the platform uses clickthrough or impression fees, so their welfare is una¤ected. Likewise, the marginal …rm earns zero pro…ts regardless, so it too is una¤ected. However, inframarginal …rms-those displaying more attractive ads-are strictly worse o¤. To see this, note that the pro…ts of the ith most attractive …rm (i < n) are
When the platform uses clickthrough fees exclusively, …rm i earns
In contrast, when the platform exclusively uses impression fees, equation
n 1 "= and …rm i earns
Thus, the bene…ts to the platform of exclusively using clickthrough fees comes entirely out of the hides of inframarginal …rms. 7 Proposition 1 also reveals that, for a given number of advertisers, the optimal clickthrough fee is v less a discount that depends on two factors. The …rst factor, " v , accounts for the fact that the marginal …rm bears transactions costs of creating ad copy to advertise on the platform. The platform thus …nds it optimal to discount c by the fraction of total available surplus ( v) eaten up by these costs. The second factor, 1= (1 ) n 1 , discounts for competition among advertisers, and represents a reduction in clickthrough fees to induce the marginal …rm to use the platform. It is intuitive that the larger is n; the greater the discount in c required to induce a given level of entry into the channel, other things equal.
Notice that, regardless of how many advertisers the platform ultimately …nds it optimal to attract, Proposition 1 indicates that it can optimally set T = 0 and increase c until the marginal …rm is indi¤erent between entering or not. By further adjusting c, the platform can induce entry or exit to fully optimize its pro…ts.
To determine the number of advertisers that maximizes the platform's pro…ts, substitute the expression for c (n) in equation (3) into the expression for U in equation (2) to obtain
This expression gives the platform's maximal pro…ts when n …rms enter and the clickthrough fee is set optimally. In the Appendix we show that (n + 1) U (n + 1) U (n) is strictly decreasing, so that the incremental contribution to the platform of inducing another …rm to enter declines as more …rms use its channel. Since (1) > 0; the platform optimally induces at least one …rm to enter. Since lim n!1 (n + 1) < 0, the optimal number of …rms (from the platform's perspective) is …nite. Finally, since there are only N potential entrants, the optimal number of advertisers cannot exceed N: Thus, the optimal number of advertisers, n , satis…es 1 n N and the optimal fees generating this level of entry are 7 Since any (T; c) satisfying equation (1) is a convex combination of these two extreme contracts, the result holds locally as well-any shift from CPM to CPC pricing for a given n harms inframarginal …rms.
as in Proposition 1 with n = n . The following proposition provides a closed form solution for n and summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 2 A pro…t maximizing platform induces n …rms to advertise through its channel, where
and d e denotes the integer ceiling function. The platform's maximal pro…ts, U = U (n ) ;
are attained by setting T = 0 and charging a clickthrough fee of c (n ) > 0:
Three aspects of this proposition are noteworthy. First, the optimal number of advertisers depends on " v ; which represents the fraction of available surplus consumed by transactions costs. Proposition 2 implies that when this fraction is large, the platform …nds it optimal to limit the number of competing advertisers by charging a relatively high clickthrough fee. Indeed, when this fraction exceeds the probability that a …rm's ad is deemed irrelevant by the search engine (1 ), the platform …nds it optimal to limit ads to a single …rm. As this fraction declines, the pro…t maximizing clickthrough fee decreases and the number of …rms choosing to advertise through the platform rises.
Second, as " ! 0; the pro…t-maximizing number of advertisers tends to N , the universe of potential advertisers. This is intuitive: As transactions costs decline, more and more …rms …nd it pro…table to use the channel. Additionally, a reduction in transaction costs permits the platform to charge a higher clickthrough fee. Indeed, when N is unbounded, the optimal clickthrough fee converges to v as " tends to zero (and hence, n tends to in…nity).
Intuitively, as the number of …rms increases, the platform becomes increasingly certain that at least one …rm's ad will be relevant. Since consumers only click on the best of the relevant ads, and a …rm only pays the platform if its ad is clicked, the platform can extract the full value, v, from the …rm that is clicked.
Finally, it is useful to discuss how changes in -which in the present model measures the platform's "e¢ ciency"in matching relevant ads to consumers-impact the platform and participants. Notice in Proposition 2 that, generically, log
is not integervalued and
. Hence, small changes in generically have no e¤ect on n , the equilibrium number of advertisers. Equation (2) implies that, for a given c; an increase in increases platform pro…ts. Since the platform is always free to leave c unchanged in response to an increase in , it follows that @U =@ > 0. Consequently, small improvements in match e¢ ciency generically bene…t the platform.
A Richer Model
While the simple model demonstrates the optimality of using clickthrough fees exclusively, it su¤ers from several limitations. First, the outside option for …rms is assumed to be …xed and independent of the success of the platform in attracting advertisers, shoppers, and clicks. While this may make sense in settings where consumers are not engaged in directed search, i.e. where the display of an ad is incidental to the intentions of consumers visiting the platform, in many settings consumer search might be directed toward a purchase decision.
For instance, the search query "quality hotels in Bloomington" is presumably made with the intent of booking a hotel in that charming midwestern city and so advertisements about the hospitality possibilities are welcomed by consumers. The absence of such ads may well lead the consumer to utilize other channels, such as visiting the websites of hotel chains directly, to secure accommodation.
Second, the decision to display an ad is not under the control of …rms-rather it is determined exogenously, presumably through the platform's algorithms designed to match advertisers to (implicit) consumer needs. While this is reasonable when consumers are engaged in non-directed search, it seems problematic in circumstances where a consumer's purchase intentions may be readily discerned. Third, both the attractiveness of advertisements and the value of a click are assumed to be outside of the control of …rms. While this makes sense when these attributes are based on long-lived characteristics such as brand or reputation, it makes less sense when they depend on ‡exible characteristics of the ad, such as the price charged. In short, the previous analysis assumes that (1) the outside option for …rms is exogenous; (2) a is exogenous; and (3) and v are exogenous.
In this section, we o¤er a model that relaxes all of these assumptions and demonstrates that the exclusive use of clickthrough fees remains optimal in a directed search environment.
Perhaps the purest form of directed search occurs at a price comparison site-a "virtual market" that consumers visit primarily to obtain price information. Such sites provide consumers a complete list of the prices charged by all …rms advertising a given product on the platform. The platform may decide the order to present o¤ers, but does not exclude any advertised price. Regardless of the order, a single mouse click typically enables a shopper to sort prices from lowest to highest to easily identify the best price. Figure 2 o¤ers a screenshot of the consumer experience for a typical price comparison site.
Over the past decade, empirical research has documented three main stylized facts regarding prices on such sites: (1) Seemingly identical advertised products exhibit considerable price dispersion; (2) …rms'positions in the distribution of prices, as well as the identity of the …rm o¤ering the lowest price, change frequently; and (3) the number of …rms advertising prices for a given product is highly variable, changing from day-to-day. 8 Thus, the price dispersion in Figure 2 is the rule rather than the exception for products advertised at comparison sites. The model presented below comes from a class of models frequently used to rationalize these facts. Two key features of this class of models are: (1) of these and many other papers that document these properties. 9 The model presented here readily extends to environments with multiple comparison sites, provided that …rms and shoppers single-home (for example, are loyal to a particular price comparison site). 1 0 See Proposition 1 in Baye and Morgan for the conditions under which this is an optimal search strategy on the part of shoppers.
As a practical matter, clicks and visits to websites do not always translate into sales. 11 Consumer "shopping carts" are abandoned regularly. To account for this, we assume that visits and clicks translate into sales only some of the time. Speci…cally, a loyal customer purchases the product with probability 2 (0; 1], while a click from a shopper is converted into a sale with probability 2 (0; 1]. In industry parlance, and are conversion rates.
As with the simple model, the gatekeeper operating the comparison site has two instruments to earn revenues: the impression fee (T 0) and clickthrough fee (c 0) charged to …rms utilizing its channel. 12 In return for these fees, a …rm's price is displayed to shoppers visiting the gatekeeper's site. The impression fee is paid regardless of whether a consumer clicks or ultimately purchases an item, and, since a …rm's ad is served to all shoppers, is equivalent to CPM pricing. The clickthrough fee is paid only if the consumer clicks and regardless of whether a purchase is made; it represents the CPC component of utilizing the channel.
Each …rm independently determines its price and whether to advertise it at the comparison site. 13 The timing of decisions is as follows. First, the gatekeeper announces fees (T; c) in an attempt to maximize its pro…ts. Given the fee structure associated with this channel, …rms simultaneously and independently choose (p i; i ); that is, they determine their prices and whether to advertise them at the comparison site. Finally, consumers browse the internet and make purchase decisions.
We solve the model by …rst characterizing symmetric Nash equilibrium …rm behavior for a given (T; c) 0; and then allow the comparison site to optimally determine the pro…t-maximizing level of its fees. Our focus on symmetric equilibria is motivated by several considerations. First, since the attractiveness of advertised prices is endogenous and …rms are otherwise identical, it seems arbitrary to assume that …rms somehow coordinate on entry based on their index number or some other criterion. Second, it makes the model consistent with the extant literature where symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria rationalize price dispersion and variation in the number of …rms advertising on price comparison sites.
Finally, the symmetry assumption permits us to study how advertising fees impact …rms' demands for advertising in a parsimonious way and to examine the extent to which the optimality of clickthrough fees in the simple model stems from asymmetries.
Firm Behavior
Equilibrium …rm behavior is similar to that in Baye and Morgan (2001) and has the following features (see the Appendix for details and a formal proof). First, consistent with Second, each …rm advertises a price on the comparison site with probability 2 (0; 1), so there is variation in the observed number of ads. A …rm that does not advertise simply charges a price of r on its own website-the reservation price of its loyal customers.
Third, a …rm's outside option depends on the advertising decisions of other …rms. In particular, a …rm that advertises a price of p on the comparison site earns expected pro…ts
while it earns
if it does not advertise. Since, in equilibrium, F is determined such that each …rm is indi¤erent between advertising any price p 2 [p 0 ; r] on the comparison site and simply charging r on its own website, (p) = 0 for all p 2 [p 0 ; r]. In particular, setting (r) = 0 determines the equilibrium advertising propensity, : This is the analog to the entry condition (equation 1) of the simple model:
The left-hand-side is a …rm's expected pro…ts when it displays the worst possible ad on the comparison site (a price of r). The right-hand-side is its outside option-its expected pro…ts when it exclusively sells through its own website. Notice that the value of the …rm's outside option is decreasing in , which is endogenous.
We may solve equation (7) for to obtain the equilibrium advertising propensities of …rms as a function of the comparison site's fee-setting decisions:
for T + " < S (r m) 
The Optimality of Clickthrough Fees
Given that each …rm advertises its price on the comparison site with probability , the price comparison site's pro…ts are
Similar to the analogous expression in equation (2), the …rst term re ‡ects the comparison site's expected CPM revenues while the second term is clickthrough (or CPC) revenues.
Notice that impression revenues depend on the expected number of ads ( N ) while clickthrough revenues depend on the probability that at least one …rm advertises 1 (1 ) N at the site. Despite the similarity in objective functions, the endogeneity of …rms'outside options and complicates the determination of the comparison site's optimal fee structure.
We are now in a position to show that the price comparison site maximizes pro…ts by exclusively utilizing a clickthrough fee, and to identify the optimal level of that fee. Since the platform can induce …rms to employ given (equilibrium) advertising propensities through di¤ering combinations of impression and clickthrough fees, we use a two-step procedure similar to what we did in the simple model. In the …rst step, we show that for a given , the platform maximizes pro…ts by exclusively using clickthrough fees. In the second step, we pin down the advertising propensities that maximize the platform's pro…ts. The optimal clickthrough fee is then the one that induces these advertising propensities.
It is convenient to rewrite equation (8) to obtain the locus of (T; c) choices that induce a given advertising propensity:
Substituting equation (10) into equation (9) yields (after simpli…cation)
Notice that, similar to the simple model, @U=@c = S (1 ; N ). By Lemma 1, we know this is strictly positive when …rms are active at the price comparison site (i.e., > 0).
Hence, we have shown:
Proposition 3 A pro…t-maximizing price comparison site uses clickthrough fees exclusively.
Intuitively, the comparison site's expected revenues from impression fees depend on the average number of ads and the ex ante amount …rms are willing to pay to advertise, while expected clickthrough revenues depend on the probability that at least one …rm advertises and the amount a …rm is willing to pay when it "wins"all the clicks. Thus, clickthrough fees are superior because of the same order statistic e¤ect that occurred in the simple model.
Unlike the simple model where the platform's gain from switching from CPM to CPC (for a given n) occurs solely at the expense of inframarginal …rms, here the gains (for a given ) arise purely at the expense of consumers, who end up paying higher prices as …rms adjust their pricing behavior in response to the changing fee structure. To see this, recall that all …rms are marginal in a symmetric equilibrium, so they are neither helped nor harmed from the shift to CPC for a given : Thus, improved pro…ts at the price comparison site come purely at the expense of consumers.
It remains to determine the advertising propensity induced by the comparison site.
Proposition 3 implies that, for a given value of ; the optimal fee structure has T = 0.
Thus, the clickthrough fee that induces a given , denoted c ( ), is the solution to equation
Substituting this expression into the comparison site's payo¤ function when T = 0 yields the comparison site's pro…ts solely as a function of the advertising propensity. It is helpful (and equivalent), to write this expression in terms of the complement, the chance a …rm does not advertise, z 1 :
The fundamental tradeo¤ expressed in this equation is intuitive-increasing …rms' advertising propensities (reducing z) bene…ts the price comparison site by reducing the chance that no …rms list, but this comes at the cost of having to reduce the clickthrough fee to induce the higher advertising propensities.
The …rst-order condition for maximizing equation (12) is
Notice that @U=@z is positive for z arbitrarily close to zero, and negative when z = 1.
Moreover, the second-order condition is satis…ed, since
Hence, there is a unique value of z that solves the …rst order condition. Using equation 
Comparative Analysis
One of the advantages of tailoring the richer model to …t a particular online institution is that it permits us to examine how the platform and market participants change their behavior in response to changes in the parameters of the model. In this section, we show how changes in conversion rates and transactions costs impact the comparison site and …rms.
Conversion Rates
Conversion rates-the chance that a click turns into a sale-are critically important to online advertisers as well as platforms. From the point of view of …rms, it is hardly worthwhile to pay for clicks that don't lead to sales. Likewise, a platform that delivers clicks but no sales is unlikely to be able to sustain advertising revenues. Conversion rates depend on the types of consumers attracted to a site as well as the ease of use of the site.
In the model, there are two conversion rates: those of shoppers ( ) and loyals ( ).
We …rst examine how changes in the conversion rate of shoppers using the comparison site ( ) impact advertisers and the price comparison site. While is exogenous, comparative analysis of changes in conversion rates on the comparison site sheds light on its incentives to make long-term investments to improve conversion rates. The intuition is as follows (a detailed proof is contained in the appendix). As the conversion rate of shoppers increases, the total surplus generated through the comparison site's channel increases. Other things equal, this induces …rms to advertise more frequently.
Thus, were the comparison site to respond by leaving the clickthrough fee unchanged, its pro…ts would increase purely through more intensive advertising. Now, since the optimal clickthrough fee balances the marginal bene…t of extracting surplus from advertisers with the marginal cost of curtailing advertising propensities-and an increase in conversion rates increases these bene…ts and reduces these costs (through their e¤ect on )-it is optimal for the price comparison site to raise its clickthrough fee. This accounts for part (a) of the proposition. Part (b) of the proposition stems from the fact that the strategic reaction of the comparison site to raise the clickthrough fee in response to an increase in does not overwhelm the direct e¤ect of raising the value of the channel through higher conversion rates.
Together, these results suggest that in an even richer model where the price comparison site could invest to improve the conversion rates of shoppers at its site, it would ignore this externality on …rms, and therefore, have a tendency to underinvest on this aspect of its site.
This perhaps explains why, despite years of lamenting the poor conversion rates in online markets, they remain stubbornly low.
How do higher conversion rates "o¤"the comparison site, those of loyals ( ), impact the platform and …rms? The price comparison site's optimal clickthrough fee and induced level of advertising, summarized in Proposition 1, are independent of ; so remains unchanged.
Thus, the comparison site's pro…ts are unchanged. In contrast, the equilibrium pro…ts of …rms,
are increasing in the conversion rate of loyals, so …rms bene…t.
Proposition 6
In equilibrium, an increase in the conversion rate of loyals:
(a) Has no e¤ ect on the comparison site's optimal clickthrough fee or its equilibrium pro…ts.
(b) Has no e¤ ect on …rm advertising propensities but does raise their pro…ts.
This proposition suggests that …rms also have incentives to make investments to improve clickthrough rates at their individual websites-that is, to make it easier for their "loyal" consumers to transform clicks into sales. Practical examples include loyalty programs, one click purchasing and the like. One might think that, since the relative value of the price comparison site channel has fallen, it would be induced to "compete" by lowering fees.
The ‡aw in this reasoning is that the incremental value of the comparison site remains unchanged for a …rm charging the highest price-and therefore equilibrium advertising propensities (and comparison site pro…ts) remain unchanged. In contrast, a …rm o¤ering the lowest price (p 0 ) now …nds that price unattractive, and the equilibrium distribution of advertised prices increases as a result of the increase in . In short, increases in induce …rms to advertise less attractive prices, such that the expected pro…ts from advertising on the comparison site increase to that of their outside option.
Transactions Costs
Next, we study how transactions costs (") a¤ect participants at the price comparison site.
While the model treats these costs as exogenous, in the long-run the price comparison site could presumably invest to reduce these costs. Such investments might be in terms of ease of use of its site, better interoperability with clients, automating advertising requests, less need for prepaid accounts, and so on.
Proposition 7
In equilibrium, an increase in transactions costs:
(a) Reduces both the optimal clickthrough fee and pro…ts of the price comparison site. 
Di¤erences Between the Two Models
While the models in Sections 2 and 3 are similar in that they both rationalize the switch from CPM to CPC that has occurred over the past decade, there are some potentially important di¤erences. One key di¤erence that we highlighted earlier concerned who won and who lost from this shift. In the simple model, increased platform pro…ts came at the expense of inframarginal …rms whereas the richer model implied that consumers ultimately bore the burden of this shift. This section highlights two additional di¤erences: (1) In the simple model, the platform does not bene…t from the ability to o¤er an exclusive advertising contract, while in the richer model it does (at least in the short-run); and (2) in the richer model, platform pro…ts fall discontinuously when transactions costs increase from zero, while they decline continuously in the simple model. The endogenous outside option in the richer model drives this discontinuity. This section examines these di¤erences, beginning with di¤erences related to transactions costs.
"Small" vs. Zero Transactions Costs
Let c (") and U (") denote the optimal clickthrough fee and platform pro…ts when transactions costs are " > 0, and let c (0) be the optimal clickthrough fee when transactions costs are zero. Our next proposition shows that, in the richer model, the case where " = 0 is materially di¤erent than the "-small case.
Proposition 8 In the richer model, there is a discontinuity in both the optimal clickthrough fee and platform pro…ts at " = 0 (i.e., when there are no transactions costs). There are no such discontinuities in the simple model. Speci…cally, (a) In the richer model,
The reader might wonder why the richer model leads to a discontinuity at " = 0 while the simple model displays no such discontinuity. The answer is that the simple model assumes 
Exclusive Contracts
Up until now, we have assumed that the contracts o¤ered by the platform were nonexclusive: All …rms were o¤ered the same contract, (T; c), and able to advertise at the site under these terms. Would a platform bene…t from the ability to o¤er a single …rm the exclusive right to advertise on its platform?
In the simple model, the answer is no. In e¤ect, that analysis permits the platform to o¤er an exclusive contract by regulating the number of entrants, n; through its choice of the clickthrough fee. By selecting a high enough clickthrough fee, the platform attracts only the …rm with the highest quality ad, and the clickthrough fee is set in such a way that this single …rm is indi¤erent between participating or not. Clearly, the platform can do no better under an exclusive arrangement. However, Proposition 2 showed that, generically, the platform does not wish to restrict entry to a single …rm. Thus, the ability to o¤er an exclusive contract is not bene…cial in the simple model.
The same is not true of the richer model. Suppose …rst that payments under an exclusive contract are contingent on the exclusive …rm's decision to advertise its price at the price comparison site. In this case, if the price comparison site o¤ered such a contract, the exclusive …rm could sign it (thus foreclosing rivals from advertising on the site) and then choose not to advertise its price. This would guarantee the exclusive …rm 1=N of the shoppers visiting its own website and eliminate any payments to the price comparison site.
Thus, the price comparison site must moderate its fee under such an exclusive contract to make this option unattractive.
For this reason, when the price comparison site solely relies on clickthrough fees under an exclusive contract, its optimal fee is
This leaves the exclusive …rm indi¤erent between advertising a price of r at the comparison site and not advertising, and thus an optimizing exclusive …rm can do no better than advertise a price of r with probability one. Similarly, if the price comparison site used only an impression fee in an exclusive arrangement, then the pro…t-maximizing fee is
Unlike optimal non-exclusive contracts, where the price comparison site has a strict incentive to solely use clickthrough fees, exclusive contingent contracts lead to a neutrality result: The price comparison site earns the same expected pro…ts, U E = Sc E , regardless of whether it uses optimal clickthrough fees, impression fees, or a combination of the two.
To see that exclusivity bene…ts the price comparison site, recall that its pro…t under the optimal non-exclusive contract is U = 1 N Sc , where c is
Since > 0; it is immediate that c E > c and U < U E , i.e., pro…ts are higher under the exclusive arrangement. Intuitively, by committing to eliminate competition between the exclusive …rm and its rivals, the comparison site is able to charge a higher clickthrough fee and earn higher pro…ts.
To summarize:
Proposition 9 In the simple model, the platform does not bene…t from using an exclusive contract, whereas in the richer model it does.
One might worry that this di¤erence between the two models is driven by restrictions on the scope of exclusive contracts. In particular, the analysis above assumes that contracts consist only of contingent impression or clickthrough fees. While this is helpful in isolating the pure e¤ect of o¤ering an exclusive in our earlier setting, it is arguably unrealistic.
Suppose that platforms were permitted to o¤er an exclusive in exchange for a non-contingent fee; that is, an advertiser would agree to pay an up front …xed amount A for the right to be the exclusive advertiser on the platform.
In the simple model, this amendment makes no di¤erence-the platform still does not bene…t from exclusives. To see this, recall that the platform sets the clickthrough fee such that it extracts the full incremental expected surplus from the marginal advertiser.
Consequently, if the platform charged a non-contingent fee to an exclusive advertiser, it can do no better than to capture all of the expected surplus.
In the richer model, the platform may bene…t from using non-contingent, exclusive, fees. To see this, suppose that the price comparison site o¤ered …rm 1 (say) the following exclusive contract: Pay a …xed amount A = (r m) S " for the exclusive right to list on the site. (Note that this fee is paid regardless of whether the …rm advertises its price, and that neither clickthrough nor impression fees are needed under this contract.) Were …rm 1 to accept this contract, it will (optimally) list a price of r and earn pro…ts of (r m) L: If the …rm believes that some other …rm will accept a similar contract if it declines, then …rm 1 has a weak incentive to accept the exclusive contract. 14 This incentive can be made strict by reducing A by an arbitrarily small amount. Under this contract, the price comparison site captures all of the surplus from shoppers. Notice that this is an improvement over an exclusive with contingent fees and, of course, over non-exclusive contracts as well.
If exclusives are superior (at least in the richer model), why aren't they more often observed in practice? First, in many settings the simple model is an apt description, and here exclusives confer no bene…ts. In settings where the richer model is appropriate, the bene…ts from exclusion derive from the "stickiness"of shoppers on the price comparison site.
Speci…cally, shoppers are implicitly assumed to visit the price comparison site regardless of the value of the price information obtained there. This degree of loyalty to a price comparison site seems dubious. Presumably shoppers will soon realize that a comparison site running an exclusive ad for a given product is a poor source of price information and bargains, and desert it in favor of another site. The combination of unhappy consumers and disenfranchised …rms is a volatile mix for a comparison site seeking to maintain its competitive position.
Conclusion
It is by now a hackneyed phrase to refer to the internet as a dynamic environment. Yet, in terms of the pricing of advertising, it is hardly an exaggeration. The so-called CPM model of advertising-pricing ads based on the number of eyeballs or impressions-has been standard for over 100 years in old media models of advertising. This is mainly a re ‡ection of the fact that making pricing contingent on the e¤ectiveness of advertising was either impossible or prohibitively costly. As retail mogul John Wanamaker famously quipped, "Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don't know which half."
Given the prevalence and longevity of the CPM model, it is hardly surprising that it was embraced at the dawn of the internet. While the internet e¤ected many dramatic changes in the business landscape-breaking down geographic barriers, remaking supply chains, democratizing the publication process-a seemingly minor change, the ability to see that a consumer clicked on an ad, was arguably the most revolutionary. This change allowed pricing contingent on advertising e¤ectiveness, the CPC model of pricing. Here, …rms were only required to pay if a consumer clicked, i.e. if an ad were e¤ective.
The conventional view is that this change largely bene…ted advertisers. Under the CPC model, Wanamaker would no longer have to pay for the half of his advertising that was wasted, nor would he have to guess which half this was. It is obvious that the CPC model shifts the risk of ine¤ective advertising to the platform and away from advertisers. Moreover, the CPC model helps mitigate technological contrivances such as impressions consisting purely of armies of bots created by the platform. The puzzle then is why platforms were so eager to embrace this new model.
We have shown that platforms, in fact, bene…t from the CPC model. The key intuition is that CPM rates impact platform revenues through the advertising propensity of all …rms whereas CPC pricing a¤ects revenues through an order statistic-the chance that at least one …rm advertises. This latter e¤ect leads to a more muted reduction in advertising propensities from higher rates, thus making the exclusive use of clickthrough fees optimal.
We …rst showed this result in a stark environment where the attractiveness of ads and the value of an advertisers outside option (eschewing the advertising channel) are both exogenous. We also showed that the same intuition holds in a richer model where attractiveness is under the control of …rms and where the value of the outside option is endogenous.
This richer model allowed us to study other aspects of online advertising, such as conversion rates (the chance that a click turns into a sale). The low level of conversions (only about 5% at most) is a perennial worry of online platforms and advertisers. We showed that both the platform and advertisers bene…ted from investments to improve conversions, but that neither party stands to recover the full value of such an investment. Thus, there is a familiar hold-up problem present. Amazon's momentous decision to vertically integrate, becoming both a platform and a seller, may then be seen as a strategic response to this dilemma.
While the main intuition for the optimality of CPC pricing prevails in both models, there are important di¤erences. One essential di¤erence relates to transactions costs of online advertising. While the internet is rightly viewed to have dramatically lowered frictions associated with advertising, they have not been eliminated entirely. In the simple model, the platform's pro…ts increase continuously as transactions costs decrease. Endogenizing the value of the outside option, however, produces di¤erent e¤ects. Here we showed that there is a discontinuous increase in the pro…ts of the platform when transactions costs are eliminated entirely. Thus, while transactions costs online are certainly small, ignoring them entirely can yield erroneous conclusions about market power.
To summarize, we see our main contribution as shedding light on how a seemingly trivial technological change-the ability to (imperfectly) observe advertising e¤ectiveness-fundamentally changed how advertising is priced. The value unlocked by this shift in pricing is enormous. For instance Google, whose revenues are almost entirely derived through CPC pricing, did not exist at the dawn of the internet but now enjoys a market capitalization of $172 billion-a testament to the e¢ cacy of CPC.
A Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 relies, in part, on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 U (n + 1) U (n) is strictly decreasing in n for all n 1:
Proof. To establish the claim, we show that the di¤erence in di¤erences is decreasing in n:
For all n 2; we have
When n = 1; we have
Next, we will show that a …nite value of n is always optimal.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique integer 1 n < 1 that maximizes platform pro…ts. This is the largest integer such that
Thus, for su¢ ciently large values of n; adding an additional …rm reduces the platform's pro…ts. Next, notice that U (1) U (0) > 0, since " < v. Thus, n 1. These observations together with Lemma 2 imply that there exists a unique …nite value of n that maximizes platform pro…ts.
To complete the proof of Proposition 2, we establish the closed form solution n . First, notice that n = 1 if and only if
Next, notice that n = 2 is optimal i¤
It is easy to see that this interval is non-empty. Similarly, for all n > 2; we obtain
where again, the interval is non-empty by inspection. Using the right-hand inequality and taking logs yields
Now, since n is an integer, we obtain as its solution:
where d e denotes the integer ceiling function.
Performing the same exercise for the left-hand inequality reveals
where b c denotes the integer ‡oor function. This completes the proof.
Characterization of Firm Behavior in the Richer Model
First, observe that a …rm that does not advertise …nds it optimal to price at r: To see this, notice that for any symmetric advertising propensity 2 [0; 1], a …rm's pro…ts from not advertising are:
which is maximized at p = r: This yields the value of the outside option given in equation II. When T < S (r m)
(a) Each …rm advertises its price on the price comparison site with probability
(b) Conditional on advertising a price at the comparison site, a …rm's advertised price may be viewed as a random draw from
on [p 0 ; r] ; where
(c) Each …rm earns expected pro…ts of
By way of contradiction, suppose there is a symmetric equilibrium in which …rms are active under the stated conditions. By the usual reasoning (see Baye and Morgan, 2001 ), this equilibrium must be in atomless mixed-strategies with an upper support of r. Letting 
Proof of Propositions 5, 6 and 7
We …rst apply the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (13) at z = ; the complement of the optimal equilibrium advertising propensity, to establish the claims regarding the impact on …rms'advertising propensities. 
We next establish the e¤ects on the optimal clickthrough fee. Since the optimal click- Since and c are independent of , it then immediately follows that dU =d = 0: Since we have already established that an increase in " increases and reduces the optimal c; we
Finally, since we have already shown that an increase in reduces and increases the optimal c; we have dU d > 0
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8
It is su¢ cient to prove parts (a) and (b) of the proposition to establish the result.
Proof of (a): Fix " = 0 and suppose that the price comparison site chooses T = 0 and c = (r m) . We claim that it is an equilibrium for …rms to advertise with probability one and charge a price of r. To see this, note that if a …rm conforms to the putative strategy best response. Next, notice that a …rm cannot pro…tably deviate by lowering its price. This is obvious when the …rm does not advertise and, when it does advertise, it earns negative pro…ts per shopper if it chooses any price p < r: Therefore, pricing at r, and hence the asserted strategies, are an equilibrium response to T = 0 and c = (r m) . Finally, notice that with this fee structure the price comparison site captures all of the contestable surplus, so there is no contract yielding it higher pro…ts. Thus, when " = 0, c (0) = (r m) and U (0) = S (r m) . 
